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China’s banking market is one of the most attractive investment targets for financial institu-
tions worldwide especially since the opening up of the market in December 2006. Based on 
interviews with experts this paper analyses the question of benefits and risks of foreign direct 
investments into Chinese banks. As a result it can be shown that there is no unique answer. 
Rather it depends on the strategic goals of the foreign institute itself. The paper recommends 
certain strategies based on the answers of the experts. 
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1  Introduction  - Executive Summary 
The following working paper is the result of a Master-Thesis, written in the first half of 2007 
at the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management. The thesis was inspired by the seminar 
Banking and Finance in China, which is an integrated part of the Master of Science program 
at Frankfurt School and the book The Future of Banking in China published at the end of 
2006
1. The expert interviews in China were conducted in cooperation with the Shanghai In-
ternational Banking and Finance Institute (SIBFI), the bank training institute of Frankfurt 
School in China since 2004. 
The  paper  raises  the  question  of  the  strategic  value  of  investments  of  foreign  banks  into 
China’s banking sector. The importance of the question is evident, given the fact that China is 
not only the fastest growing economy on earth but also disposes of the most expanding and 
hence attractive banking market worldwide. Foreign direct investments into Chinese banks, 
for example, were four times higher in 2006, which ended a five year transition period open-
ing up the banking market, than in the year 2001, when China joined the WTO
2.  
The paper is highly empirically. It is based on interviews with bankers and experts who are 
familiar with the Chinese market and the investments of foreign banks. The number of inter-
views is limited but nevertheless significant given the high degree of the interviewees’ exper-
tise on the one side and the narrow market on the other.  
The interviews focused on three areas: 
• Principle considerations to invest into Chinese banks 
• Specific investment considerations 
• Potential pitfalls of these investments 
 
                                                 
1 Löchel, Horst, Zhao, Xiaoju (2006). 
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Regarding the question whether it makes in principle sense to invest into Chinese banks, the 
answers are clearly in favor for retail banking. For both corporate and retail banking the con-
cern still remains how to become influential in the investment target given the well-known 
thresholds for foreign investments into Chinese banks
3. Last but not least, it is worthwhile to 
note that no single expert is expecting short term financial gains and even for the long run 
only a short majority of 53% are expecting profits. 
Also the specific investment goals are clearly in favor for retail banking given the fact that the 
access to the branch network and the client base are seen as the by far most important invest-
ment purposes of foreign investors. It is interesting to note, that most of the experts see the 
joint-stock banks as the most valuable targets whereas the big state owned banks are even 
behind the City Commercial Banks. This reflects the concerns about the limited decision mak-
ing power in such big tankers. It should be noted in this context that China’s postal bank at 
that time was not part of the questionnaire. 
The answers to the question of the pitfalls of foreign investment into Chinese banks reflect the 
regulatory environment in China. Most of the experts perceive the lack of control over the 
investment target in conjunction with the comparatively low standards of corporate govern-
ance in Chinese banks as the most pressing issue. Furthermore, cultural differences including 
language are other hurdles of a successful management of the investment. 
Overall the results of the expert interviews show that there is no unique answer about the stra-
tegic value of foreign investments into Chinese banks. Rather it depends on the strategy of the 
foreign bank itself. A foreign financial institute, for example, which wants to enter the Chi-
nese retail market clearly needs a strategic, domestic partner in China given the sheer size of 
the country and the lack of an own client base. However, which kind of partnership is chosen 
and which partner is selected depends on the risk appetite of the foreign institute and on how 
ambitious its China strategy is. Our study indicates that investing into China’s joint stock 
banks is strategically superior to investing into the big state owned banks due to the higher 
degree of influence which can be gained over these smaller targets. 
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2  Investments in Chinese banks as a strategic option of market explora-
tion  
2.1  Research methodology 
2.1.1  Type of survey and data sources 
The following analysis of the strategic value of investments in Chinese banks is based on in-
terviews  with  senior  executives  of  foreign  banks,  investment  bankers  advising  on  M&A 
transactions as well as strategy consultants with a focus on the Chinese financial services sec-
tor. Foreign bank executives were interviewed due to their immediate relation to the research 
topic. They operate in the Chinese banking market on a daily basis and are therefore familiar 
with the market forces as well as the growth options available to foreign banks. Many of them 
personally dealt with the question whether their bank should invest in a Chinese player either 
directly or indirectly before. Investment bankers and strategy consultants were interviewed, 
because they are able to draw from a broad range of advisory experiences in the industry and 
region. They are hence more detached from any individual player’s specific situation in China 
and are therefore able to adopt a neutral but yet well informed perspective.  
Most interviews were conducted in the form of face to face meetings with the interviewees at 
their offices in Hong Kong or Shanghai during May and June 2007. Whenever time con-
straints did not allow for personal meetings, interviews were conducted over the telephone. In 
very rare exceptions, when respondents’ schedules neither permitted personal nor telephone 
interviews, they were sent a research questionnaire via e-mail and responded in the same way. 
All interviews were standardized open-ended interviews and based on a research question-
naire containing 6 questions
4. These questions explored whether strategic investments in Chi-
nese banks generally make sense, where their strategic value is to be found and which pitfalls 
to be aware of in order to realize their inherent value. The interviews lasted in between 15 to 
45 minutes with the average duration having been approximately 30 minutes. The question-
naire itself was designed so that it could be adequately answered within 15 minutes.  
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Respondents were encouraged to provide examples, share personal experiences and elaborate 
further on specific topics whenever time permitted this though. This explains the noteworthy 
spread in duration between the longest and shortest interviews. The reason for choosing this 
approach was, that it allowed for data to be collected in a structured way while at the same 
time providing enough flexibility for interviewees to share valuable insights not specifically 
asked for.  
2.1.2  Data volume and quality 
The total number of interviews conducted amounts to 21. Of the respondents, 9 were based in 
Hong Kong, 11 in Shanghai and 1 in Beijing. The majority of all interviews, i.e. 14 were face 
to face meetings, 5 were telephone interviews and only 2 respondents submitted their answers 
via e-mail. There have been 11 foreign bank executives, 5 investment bankers and 5 strategy 
consultants  interviewed
5.  All  interviewees  were  either  senior  professionals  or  held  senior 
management  positions  at  their  respective  firms.  They  furthermore  possessed  longstanding 
experience in the industry and region. Against this background all interviewees were fully 
qualified to participate in the survey. 
Limitations on the data quality arise from several factors. First of all, it was not possible to 
collect all data with one uniform method. Even though questions were asked in the exact same 
way in face to face meetings, over the telephone and via e-mail, the different methods of data 
collection might have influenced the way interviewees responded to some extent. Secondly, 
respondents were asked to share their personal opinions and views. Although argued on the 
grounds of observable facts and logic, the statements made are hence subjective in nature. A 
third limitation arises from the low number of interviews conducted. The survey results can 
therefore not be considered as universally valid or fully representative. It is however possible 
to recognize consistent elements and clear trends within the survey results, which allow for 
qualitative interpretations. Considering the seniority of interviewees as well as their extensive 
experience in the Chinese banking market, it can be assumed that their statements come quite 
close to reflecting the actual market conditions. The inclusion of investment bankers and strat-
egy consultants, who are detached from and therefore not influenced by any specific foreign 
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bank’s strategic setup, furthermore helps in presenting a more comprehensive and balanced 
picture.  
2.1.3  Method of result presentation  
Results will be presented using descriptive data analysis. Every category, to which certain 
parts of the questionnaire were assigned to, will commence with a brief presentation of the 
respective key findings in aggregate form. This will be followed by a more detailed descrip-
tion of the qualitative answers collected. In a third step, the results will then be matched with 
complementary information and discussed further.  
2.2  Investments in Chinese banks – a question of principle 
Before going into a more specific assessment of strategic value
6, it is essential to evaluate 
whether acquisitions of minority stakes in Chinese banks generally make sense from a foreign 
financial institution’s point of view. To provide an answer to this question, three aspects will 
be taken into consideration. First of all, it will be determined if the acquisition of a mere mi-
nority stake itself is an adequate tool of exploring the Chinese market. Due to differences in 
the underlying market dynamics, this shall be done separately for corporate and retail bank-
ing. It shall secondly be elicited whether it is expected that foreign banks will be given a 
chance to upgrade their investments to majority stakes in the near future (1-2 years). The rele-
vance of this is that if a major regulatory turning point would be anticipated, investments 
would not be primarily made because of making sense under the prevailing circumstances, but 
rather in an effort to position oneself in the best possible way to capitalize on the changes 
ahead. Thirdly, the financial perspective should not be neglected completely. It will be inves-
tigated whether investments in Chinese banks are considered to be financially attractive. 
 
 
                                                 
6 For a discussion on the nature of strategy please refer to Porter, Michael E. (1996),  
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2.2.1  Presentation of survey results 
2.2.1.1  Investments in Chinese banks not per se advisable 
At the outset, interviewees were asked, whether they would advise a foreign bank to acquire a 
minority stake in a local (Chinese) bank as a strategic means of exploring the Chinese market. 
They were furthermore requested to differentiate between corporate and retail banking in their 
answer. Figure 1 (below) presents an overview of the answers obtained. 
Responses Corporate Banking Retail Banking
Yes 10 15
No 7 3
Depends (Dep.) 4 3
Total respondents 21 21
Would you advise a foreign bank to acquire a minority stake in a local bank as a strategic means of exploring the Chinese 
market?













0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Retail
Corporate
Source: own illustration and calculations 
As far as corporate banking is concerned, most respondents made the general remark that the 
currently permitted business scope and available organic growth options (including local in-
corporation) would be sufficient for foreign banks to serve their captive audience of multina-
tional clients. 45% of the interviewees find investments in Chinese banks however definitely 
advisable to tap the domestic Chinese corporate banking market. 35% would not suggest ac-
quiring a minority stake in a local bank at all and 20% believe that there can be no clear an-
swer to this question as it would always depend on the individual case. 
Interviewees voting in favor of investments in Chinese banks by the majority named access to 
the target’s existing infrastructure (branch network), client base and the learning experience 
associated with the investment as the key investment considerations. Since these strategic 
benefits were discussed separately and in more detail at a later stage of the interviews, they 
will not be elaborated on at this point. A more in-depth examination of these benefits will 
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Survey participants voting against investments in Chinese banks emphasized, that overseas 
financial institutions would be considerably more advanced than their Chinese counterparts in 
terms of service quality and product offering and that a nationwide presence would not be 
necessary to capture an adequate share of the market. They therefore saw them well posi-
tioned to achieve growth in corporate banking without falling back on acquisitions. One re-
spondent also pointed out, that many leading Chinese and foreign enterprises possess central-
ized financing functions in Beijing or Shanghai and make use of domestic cash pooling and 
electronic banking. They could therefore easily be served by foreign banks through their own 
branches in these cities. An investment in a local player would therefore not yield noteworthy 
added value.  
Turning to the retail banking market, 70% of the interviewees would advise foreign financial 
institutions to invest in a local bank, only 15% would not do so and 15% would make the de-
cision completely dependent on the individual players’ profiles. The majority of respondents 
argued that no international bank has so far been able to build a branch network big enough to 
tap the retail banking market at a large scale. Lacking a noteworthy distribution platform 
themselves, foreign players would be left with little choice but to make Chinese banks’ distri-
bution channels accessible to them via equity investments. Respondents also mentioned ac-
cess to a broad client base and the associated learning experience as key investment consid-
erations. These strategic benefits will also be examined in more detail in section 2.3.1.1.   
Interviewees who argued against acquisitions of equity stakes to explore the Chinese retail 
banking market either believe that there would be more creative ways to capitalize on the 
strengths of Chinese banks (e.g. non-equity based strategic alliances) or are concerned with 
the fact that an investor as minority shareholder would have very little to no control over the 
business development.  
2.2.1.2  Uncertainty about the regulatory environment prevails 
This last concern directly leads to the next question: will foreign strategic investors be able to 
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Yes, for some bank groups 5
No 10
Total respondents 21
As of today, foreign banks may only acquire 20% of a Chinese bank’s equity. Do you expect this
regulation to change over the next 1-2 years?








Source: own illustration and calculations 
28.6% of all respondents expect the 20% threshold to change over the next 1-2 years, 23.8% 
suppose that this will however be limited to some groups of banks and 47.6% see no regula-
tory change ahead in the near-term. The participants anticipating the 20% threshold to be in-
creased mostly do not foresee a sudden change allowing foreign investors to gain 100% eq-
uity control of Chinese banks per se. They rather expect a gradual erosion to take place over 
time.  
Those respondents foreseeing a lifting of the 20% threshold restricted to some bank groups 
only, unanimously argued that the Chinese government would for the sake of maintaining 
macroeconomic control not allow foreign investors to take majority stakes in the big four 
state-owned commercial banks. The respondents again expect a gradual erosion of the thresh-
old rather than an abrupt change of rules to occur. Some of them referred to the Chinese gov-
ernment’s overall reform strategy, which would be characterized by trying out new things first 
at a smaller scale, in special economic zones for instance, before implementing them nation-
wide. They therefore expect the government to allow overseas banks to purchase majority 
stakes in a few selected targets first and if this works out well, to generally permit bigger 
stakes to be held in joint-stock and city commercial banks. One foreign bank executive also 
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holding 49% of a Chinese bank’s equity at most, which would still leave domestic sharehold-
ers in control of the respective credit institution.  
Almost half of all interviewees do not expect the current 20% threshold to be increased in the 
near-term. One frequently made point was, that this would not yield noteworthy added value 
to the Chinese side. By attracting foreign investors, the Chinese government intended to bring 
in their international expertise and capital to boost the competitiveness of local banks. Experi-
ence had shown that both goals could be satisfactorily achieved with the current regulations in 
place. Therefore it would be hard to see, why China should be keen on changing them. Many 
respondents furthermore referred to an ongoing debate in China about the endangerment of 
the  nation’s  economic  security  through  foreign  investors  gaining  too  much  influence  and 
power over the Chinese economy. Against the background of this public sentiment as well as 
the prevailing excess liquidity in the Chinese banking system, the PRC’s government would 
have stronger incentives to leave the regulation unchanged rather than modifying it. 
2.2.1.3  No speculative short-term gains possible 
53% of all respondents consider acquisitions of minority stakes in Chinese banks to be an 
attractive long-term financial investment, 33% oppose this view and 14% would not commit 
themselves to a clear-cut answer. No single respondent believes that such investments would 
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Figure 3: Equity stakes in Chinese banks - definitely no short-term investment
Responses #
Yes, short term 0
Yes, long term 11
No 7
Can not tell 3
Total respondents 21
Given the sector’s current and expected future development, would you describe investments in Chinese 









Source: own illustration and calculations 
Respondents considering acquisitions of equity stakes in Chinese banks as long-term finan-
cially attractive, mostly pointed to the extremely favorable outlook on the future of the Chi-
nese banking industry and therefore perceive Chinese banks’ current valuation levels as still 
being low. According to most participants, the biggest financial gains could be made by in-
vesting into a Chinese player before it goes public. The value of the investment could easily 
be doubled or even tripled this way.  It was however frequently noted, that foreign banks 
would usually be obliged to observe a three-year holding period, during which they were not 
permitted to realize financial gains. Speculative short term investments would therefore be per 
se not possible. 
Interviewees  negating  the  financial  attractiveness  of  equity  investments  in  Chinese  banks 
mostly argued that this window of opportunity would be already gone. After the first Chinese 
banks went public, their share prices sky-rocketed and the resulting spill-over effects would 
lead to attractive targets being overpriced by today. According to these participants, the ra-
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2.2.2  Discussion of key findings 
2.2.2.1  Review of organic growth as viable alternative 
The above presented survey results suggest, that investments in Chinese banks are more bene-
ficial as part of a retail banking than of a corporate banking strategy. According to most inter-
viewees, gaining access to a local player’s distribution network
7 is the main attraction of in-
vestments in both cases. This seems to be more crucial for success in retail than in corporate 
banking. Client proximity in the form of physical branch networks is still a key decision crite-
rion for Chinese consumers in selecting a banking relationship and therefore absolutely criti-
cal for banks to succeed in the retail banking market
8. As respondents voiced concerns about 
the foreign investor not being able to exercise adequate managerial control over the target, it 
should be reviewed, whether organic growth, allowing for full managerial control, would be a 
viable alternative. 
By today no single foreign bank was able to establish a comprehensive branch network on its 
own in China
9.  
This was attributed to the regulatory environment turning the establishment of new branches 
by overseas market entrants into an extremely long-winded and cost intensive process
10.  
Furthermore the new “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Administration of 
Foreign-funded Banks”, which became effective in December 2006, now grant foreign banks 
the right to incorporate locally and thereby achieve the same regulatory status as domestic 
banks
11. The relevance of this is that local incorporation allows foreign banks to speed up the 
expansion of their branch networks dramatically. It is against this background, that locally 
incorporated foreign banks like HSBC, Standard Chartered Bank and the Bank of East Asia 
have publicly announced plans to double or even triple their branch networks in Mainland 
                                                 
7 China CITIC Bank (Ed.) (2007), p. 56 / KPMG (Ed.) (2005), p. 7. 
8 Naumann, Ivo (2006), p. 123. 
9 CBRC (Ed.) (2007), CBRC (2007), p. 133, HSBC (2007), The Bank of East Asia (2007), Standard Chartered 
Bank (2007), Citi China (2007). 
10 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (Ed.) (2006), p. 5, CBRC (2006), Löchel, Horst (2006), p. 36. 
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China over the next one to two years
12. Subject to the condition of local incorporation, organic 
growth therefore could indeed be an attractive alternative to investments in Chinese banks.  
On the other side it should not be forgotten that even leading foreign banks’ branch networks 
will remain inferior to those of their Chinese competitors for an indefinite time. This can be 
vividly illustrated through the case of HSBC, which currently operates the largest foreign 
branch network in Mainland China. Pretending in a highly ambitious scenario, that HSBC 
manages to double the number of its outlets (currently 40) over the next year and then consis-
tently keeps adding 40 new branches per year, it would still take it around 10 years to build up 
a presence comparable to that of an average joint-stock commercial bank
13. Closing the gap to 
the country’s dominant big four state-owned commercial banks with over 10,000 branches 
each or even the much smaller Bank of Communications with its 2,607 branches nationwide 
is definitely out of reach
14. This example clearly demonstrates that a sole reliance on organic 
growth is not suited to significantly increase the distribution power of foreign banks in China. 
The above sketched out scenario also assumed local incorporation, which is cost and resource 
intensive
15 and thus for many banks per se no viable option.  
 
Even leading locally incorporated foreign players such as HSBC, Standard Chartered Bank 
and Citigroup complement their organic growth with strategic investments in Chinese banks 
as part of a diversified market development strategy
16. An exception to this is only the Bank 
of East Asia, which so far relies on organic growth only
17. This does however not mean that 
the Bank of East Asia would not consider investments in Chinese banks. According to the 
M&A deal database ZEPHYR, the bank has previously been in negotiations with Shenzhen 
Commercial Bank (2003, 20% stake), Guangzhou Commercial Bank (2004, 20% stake),  
                                                 
12 Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research (2006), p. 5. 
13 Own calculation based on HSBC (2007). / China CITIC Bank (Ed.) (2007). 
14 China CITIC Bank (Ed.) (2007), p. 55. 
15 CBC Shanghai (Ed.) (2006), p. 28f. 
16 Löchel, Horst (2006), p. 41ff. 
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China Minsheng Bank (2004, unknown stake) and Dalian City Commercial Bank (2005, un-
known stake). According to the database, negotiations with Guangzhou Commercial Bank are 
still ongoing and a successful closing of the deal was in January 2007 reported to be very 
likely
18. 
2.2.2.2  Equity control might remain unachievable   
The survey participants’ opinion on whether the maximum equity stake foreign investors can 
acquire in Chinese banks would be increased in the near future greatly diverged. In fact, the 
Chinese government’s position in this regard has often been unclear in recent years
19. In its 
2007 released “Report on the Opening-up of the Chinese Banking Sector”, the CBRC stated 
that further opening up initiatives should follow the needs of the country’s economic devel-
opment and repeatedly highlighted the local incorporation oriented policy as its tool of choice 
to “…meet the development needs of foreign-funded banks.”
20 From this statement, it can be 
concluded that the CBRC would only relax the rules on equity investments, if this was benefi-
cial for China’s economic development. It is however hard to identify any significant benefit 
for the Chinese government arising from allowing foreign banks to acquire bigger equity 
shares in domestic banks unless they are unable to increase their competitiveness by their 
own.  
Several indicators actually suggest that the incentives to keep the 20% threshold in place out-
number those of increasing it. Firstly, there is a general debate in China about the threat of 
foreign-funded M&A to the country’s national economic security
21. Allowing foreign inves-
tors to acquire bigger or even majority stakes in Chinese banks is against this background a 
politically extremely sensitive issue.  
 
                                                 
18 The transaction did not close yet and there is also no updated information available.  
     Source: ZEPHYR database analysis. 
19 The Economist Intelligence Unit (Ed.) (2007), p. 25. 
20 CBRC (Ed.) (2007). 
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There is secondly a recent case in which the CBRC actively intervened to protect a major 
bank  from  being  eventually  taken  over  by  foreign  investors.  In  April  2007,  the  CBRC’s 
chairman Liu Mingkang announced that the country’s largest joint-stock commercial bank, 
Bank of Communications had been reclassified as a state-owned commercial bank. He justi-
fied this step arguing on the grounds of the Chinese economy’s overall stability (i.e. national 
economic security). When HSBC invested USD 1.75 bn in Bank of Communications, the pur-
chase agreement included a clause allowing it to increase its 19.9% stake to 40% subject to 
government approval. Due to the reclassification of Bank of Communications, this clause has 
become effectively void by law
22. 
Thirdly, the prevailing excess liquidity in the banking sector is a major concern to the Chinese 
government. Causative for the formation of China’s excess liquidity problem are the country’s 
surging foreign reserves, which are fueled by the PRC’s high trade surplus and the inflow of 
foreign investments
23. Making  regulatory  changes which would most probably  result in  a 
massive additional inflow of foreign direct investments into Chinese banks would therefore be 
counterproductive to the government’s efforts in reducing excess liquidity.   
While these indicators suggest, that the 20% threshold on foreign ownership will not be lifted 
in the near-term, they do not rule out the possibility of foreign investors taking full managerial 
control of Chinese banks on a case by case basis. There are currently two examples in China, 
where foreign investors were able to seize management control of domestic banks while still 
not holding more than 20% of the respective banks’ equity. In 2004, the American private 
equity sponsor Newbridge Capital acquired 17.9% of Shenzhen Development Bank allowing 
it to appoint the chairman and senior executives at the bank and thereby controlling it
24. Fur-
ther to that, a Citigroup led consortium acquired 85% of Guangdong Development Bank in 
2006. While Citigroup gained significant influence over the target, it only holds 20% of its 
equity. The remainder of the consortium’s 85% stake is held by domestic Chinese investors 
                                                 
22 Anderlini, Jamil / Thal Larsen, Peter / Böschen, Mark (2007).  
23 Ba, Shusong (2007), p. 15. 
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(China Life Insurance, Guangdong Finance Investment Holding, State Grid Corporation of 
China and CITIC Trust and Investment) and IBM
25.  
2.2.2.3  Financial gains – a bet on the Chinese stock market 
More than 50% of the survey participants found investments in Chinese banks to be long-term 
lucrative. In fact, most investors are obliged to hold their stakes for a minimum of three years 
and are therefore unable to realize short-term speculative gains
26. Previously conducted in-
vestments have so far performed extremely well and investors made significant paper gains. 
Goldman Sachs for instance invested USD 2.6 bn in ICBC in April 2006 and saw the value of 
its stake increase by almost USD 4 bn in October 2006 after ICBC’s initial public offering
27. 
The long-term financial attractiveness of the investment is however highly dependent on the 
future development of China’s stock market. Given the market turbulences in the start of the 
year 2008 there are signs that it could become difficult to realize the expected paper gains.  
Furthermore,  given  the  still  unnaturally  high  price-earning  ratios  on  the  stock  markets  in 
Hong Kong and Shanghai even the current valuations of Chinese listed banks appear unsus-
tainable. 
The financial attractiveness of new investments in non-listed banks greatly depends on the 
agreed upon purchase price, which is usually determined in bilateral negotiations between 
buyer and seller. Should the target go public in a positive stock market environment after-
wards, the investor could generate paper gains similar to the one described above
28. The long-
term financial attractiveness of the investment would thereby however also become dependent 
on the development of China’s stock market.  
 
 
                                                 
25 ZEPHYR database analysis. 
26 Leigh, Lamin / Podpiera, Richard (2006), p. 7. 
27 Chan, Cathy / Cox, Adrian (2006). 
28 For a list containing equity valuation multiples of foreign investments in Chinese banks in  
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From the above, it can be concluded, that the probability of realizing financial gains from in-
vestments in Chinese banks is directly linked to the country’s stock market development. 
Against the background of the current market environment, it remains doubtful whether to-
day’s equity valuations are sustainable in the long-run. 
2.3  Key investment considerations 
After having elicited whether investments in Chinese banks are generally advisable or not, the 
next step in establishing a sound foundation on which to verify the introductory hypothesis, 
that these investments yield unique strategic benefits making them indispensable for foreign 
banks to succeed in the Chinese banking market, is to examine which special benefits foreign 
financial institutions can gain through their investments. In other words, where is the unique 
strategic value of investing in a Chinese credit institution to be found? This question is closely 
interconnected with the issue of target selection and availability. The ultimate precondition to 
realizing a theoretically conceivable strategic benefit is obviously identifying the right target 
allowing for this. Both matters were addressed in the survey and the obtained results will be 
presented in the following section. 
2.3.1  Presentation of survey results 
2.3.1.1  Sources of value 
The survey participants were asked to identify the unique strategic benefits of investments in 
Chinese banks, which could not be gained through organic growth alternatives. Figure 4 (be-
low) sets forth the obtained results. The total number of times any given category was men-
tioned is not related to the number of respondents, as multiple nominations were permissible.   
From the following figure, it can clearly be seen that access to the target’s distribution net-
work (13 times mentioned) is most widely considered to be the greatest benefit foreign finan-
cial institutions can get from investing in Chinese banks. The point made by most respondents 
naming this benefit was, that foreign banks lack of geographical reach and distribution power 
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comprehensive infrastructure by taking an equity stake in a domestic player would be the fast-
est way of compensating for this disadvantage.  
Strategic benefit Number of times mentioned
Which major strategic benefits, that could not be gained through organic growth initiatives would that [i.e. an 
investment in a Chinese bank] yield?














Access to existing client base
Access to distribution network
Source: own illustration and calculations 
The second most frequently named strategic benefit was the, through an investment achiev-
able access to the target’s existing client base (9 times mentioned). Most respondents ex-
plained this in a purely quantitative context by referring to Chinese banks’ huge numbers of 
corporate and retail clients and the possibility of realizing economies of scale by tapping into 
these client bases. This would be particularly critical for designing mass market retail prod-
ucts at competitive prices.    
Some interviewees also spotted a qualitative dimension here. One foreign bank executive for 
instance voiced the opinion, that some of China’s most attractive enterprises would have built 
long-lasting banking relationships with domestic banks and that taking the detour of selling 
products under a Chinese bank’s brand name would be the only way of accessing these clients 
at all.   
The third most frequently cited benefit of investing in Chinese banks was the herewith associ-
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broad areas, in which foreign banks could greatly benefit by learning  from local players. 
These were market usages, client behavior and needs and the internal setup of the bank which 
is invested in. 
Some participants particularly highlighted the value of having a local partner to assist in navi-
gating in the, for many foreign banks alien cultural and market environment. Other interview-
ees pointed out, that the huge client bases of many Chinese banks would offer ample opportu-
nities to study and analyze the average Chinese client’s service requirements and preferences. 
Further to that, one of the strategy consultants interviewed made the point that an equity in-
vestment in a Chinese bank would provide the acquirer with the rare opportunity to adopt an 
insider’s view of the internal setup up of the target and learn about its main strengths and 
weak points. All of these learning experiences could be used to accelerate the foreign bank’s 
own learning curve in the Chinese market and could also be applied to its organic growth ef-
forts. 
Accessing the target’s informal network of relationships (guan xi in Mandarin) was men-
tioned four times as a unique strategic benefit. Here, respondents mostly had relationships to 
political decision makers and regulatory authorities in mind. It was pointed out, that possess-
ing good personal relationships to the respective authorities could considerably speed up vari-
ous bureaucratical processes.  
The remaining points mentioned as unique strategic benefits from investments in Chinese 
banks were: brand name/ reputation, RMB deposit base and RMB licenses. Since they were 
only named by one or two respondents each, they shall not be discussed in equal detail as the 
previous items. Brand name/ reputation referred to the low familiarity of Chinese consumers 
with foreign bank brands. By generating business through a local bank it is invested in, the 
foreign bank could according to the respondents capitalize on the local player’s established 
brand name and reputation. RMB deposit base and RMB licenses were not further commented 
on and only mentioned once each. 
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2.3.1.2  Target selection 
The survey participants were next asked to identify the, according to their view most suitable 
targets for foreign direct investments. Almost all respondents remained at the level of discuss-
ing investments in various groups of banks (which was explicitly asked for) and only two in-
dividual players were highlighted as exceptionally attractive targets. Figure 5 (below) pro-
vides an overview of the answers obtained as well as the key investment considerations set 
forth by the participants to explain their respective choices. The total number of times any 
given category was mentioned is not related to the number of respondents, as multiple nomi-
nations were permissible.  
Bank groups Times mentioned Key investment considerations
Joint-stock commercial banks 11 Nationwide license, control might be achieveable in the future,
modern structures, willing to learn, relatively low NPL ratios, 
reasonable investment size
City commercial banks 10 Highest potential, SME expertise and focus, influence 
achieveable, opportunities through future sector consolidation, lower 
complexity, reasonable investment size
State-owned commercial banks 4 Huge branch networks, political signal, financial investment,
acceptable transparency/ corporate governance/ NPL ratios
Rural credit cooperatives 1 Small in size, influence achieveable, reasonable investment size
Urban credit cooperatives 0 -
Others 0 -
Individual players Times mentioned Key investment considerations
China Merchants Bank 2 Entrepreneurial player, healthy balance sheet, well positioned
China Minsheng Bank 2 Entrepreneurial player, healthy balance sheet, well positioned
Given the structure of the Chinese banking sector, which group of banks or which individual player would you consider best suited for 
foreign investments and why?
 Figure 5: Second and Third tier banks best suited for foreign investors
Source: own illustration and calculations 
The survey results show a clear preference of respondents towards joint-stock commercial 
banks (11 times mentioned) and city commercial banks (10 times mentioned). Interviewees 
arguing for joint-stock commercial banks referred back to gaining access to a nationwide 
branch network as a major benefit of investing into a Chinese player, which would be achiev-
able through taking an equity stake in a JSCB. While the big four would feature even larger 
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modern, less bureaucratic structures and their greater willingness to learn, which would make 
it easier for foreign investors to effect changes in the targets’ corporate governance and credit 
approval processes. They furthermore pointed to the JSCB’s relatively healthy balance sheets 
(low NPL ratios) and the fact that their smaller size allows a foreign investor to acquire an 
adequate equity stake at a reasonable price. Investing in the big four would on the contrary 
require  a  much  higher  financial  commitment  for  a  comparatively  lower  equity  share  and 
would therefore not be a viable choice for many foreign banks. Some interviewees also noted 
that they expect equity control to become achievable in some JSCB’s in the near future. Mak-
ing an investment in these banks today would therefore provide an ideal starting point to capi-
talize on this opportunity, once it arises. Both individual players nominated as prime invest-
ment  targets,  China  Merchants  Bank  and  China  Minsheng  Bank  belong  to  the  group  of 
JSCB’s. 
According to the survey results, city commercial banks are the second best choice for foreign 
strategic investors. Most respondents voting for CCB’s argued again that their relatively small 
size would allow investors to purchase adequate shares of the targets’ equity at reasonable 
prices and that equity and management control might realistically be achievable in the future. 
It was furthermore noted, that city commercial banks would be particularly well positioned in 
SME lending, one of the Chinese banking market’s big growth opportunities
29. Some respon-
dents added that due to their small size and regional scope of operations, investments in city 
commercial banks would be less complex than in bigger players and therefore easier for for-
eign investors to handle.  
Strategic investments in the big four state-owned commercial banks emerged only as the third 
best option. The most frequently provided reason for the suitability of SOCB’s for foreign 
investors was the herewith associated opportunity of gaining access to their huge branch net-
works.  At  the  same  time,  many  respondents  noted  that  foreign  investors’  influence  on 
SOCB’s would be extremely limited. A small number of respondents stated however, that 
investments in the big SOCB’s could be strategically beneficial even if no operational gains 
were attached to it. Investing would be an important tool of demonstrating long-term com-
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mitment to the Chinese market and thus make it easier for the foreign bank to gain political 
support for other business ventures in the country. The risks associated with investments in 
the big four would be manageable due to their by today acceptable transparency and corporate 
governance levels as well as their relatively low NPL ratios. Respondents explicitly limited 
these  features  to  the  publicly  listed  SOCB’s  (i.e.  they  excluded  the  Agricultural  Bank  of 
China).  
As for other groups of banks or players, only one participant considers rural credit coopera-
tives due to their small investment size and the probability of gaining management influence 
to be good investment targets.  
2.3.2  Discussion of key findings 
2.3.2.1   Distribution network as primary attraction 
The majority of respondents named access to the target’s existing distribution network and 
client base as the two most unique strategic benefits gained through investments in Chinese 
banks. The herewith associated learning experience ranked third in the survey. It was shown 
earlier in this paper that foreign banks’ greatest competitive weakness is their lack of distribu-
tion power in China. Section 2.2.2.1. furthermore concluded that this issue can not be ade-
quately tackled by solely relying on organic growth initiatives. Seeking strategic investments 
in Chinese banks with the rationale of gaining access to their vast and widespread branch net-
works is therefore an absolutely logical step to complement organic growth. Access to an ex-
isting distribution network goes hand in hand with access to the existent client base, which is 
being served through this network. This provides the foreign strategic investor in turn with the 
critical mass of clients to launch products such as bank cards cost efficiently in China. In fact, 
many of the more prominent investments in recent years were officially justified by either 
referring to the targets’ distribution networks or customer bases (see table 1 below).   
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2004 Bank of Communications HSBC 19.90% 1,750 distribution platform (credit cards)
2005 Bank of Beijing ING Group 19.90% 215 distribution platform (retail banking)
2005 Bank of China RBS  5.00% 1,550 brand, distribution platform, customer base
2005 Bank of China UBS AG 1.60% 500 brand, distribution platform, customer base
2005 China Construction Bank Bank of America 9.00% 2,500 customer base
2005 ICBC Allianz Group 2.50% 1,000
distribution platform (insurance/ investment 
products)
2005 ICBC American Express 0.50% 200 distribution platform (bank cards)
2006 Huaxia Bank Deutsche Bank 9.90% 220
distribution platform (credit cards, wealth 
management, investment products)
 Table 1: Precedent transactions mostly target distribution network and customer base
Source: own illustration and calculations based on Bank of America (2007), p. 17 / HSBC (2004). / 
RBS (2005). / UBS (2005). Deutsche Bank (2006). / Goldman Sachs (2006). / ZEPHYR database 
analysis 
The benefit of advancing institutional learning about the Chinese market, customer needs and 
local business culture is usually not highlighted in official statements. This might largely be 
attributed to the nature of these announcements, in which the investing party is generally ea-
ger to present a win-win situation by focusing on the transaction’s benefits for the target after 
having briefly mentioned its own most obvious gains. Secondly, studying client behavior and 
internal structures at the target are rather sensitive issues which would be inappropriate to 
communicate too openly. Based on publicly available information, it is however difficult to 
assess whether the unique learning opportunities created through equity investments in Chi-
nese banks are already fully realized and capitalized on by today. 
2.3.2.2  Second and third tier banks as most attractive targets    
The survey results suggest that joint-stock commercial banks would be best suited for foreign 
strategic investors. City commercial banks emerged as the second best choice and the big four 
ranked  third.  This  section  will  take  a  more  detailed  look  at  the  respective  bank  group’s 
strengths and weaknesses to assess their attractiveness to foreign investors. 
In 2006, there were 13 joint-stock commercial banks in China. Even though they possess na-
tionwide banking licenses, their activities are generally focused on their headquarters’ regions 
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Yangtze  River  Delta  and  Pearl  River  Delta)
30.  Table  2  (below)  provides  an  overview  of 
China’s joint-stock commercial banks, their key data and shows which banks have already 
attracted foreign strategic investors. 
With an average of 451 outlets
31, their branch networks are comprehensive enough for foreign 
banks to access a sufficiently broad customer base and generate economies of scale. While the 
JSCB’s distribution power in terms of sales force size is considerably weaker than that of the 
big four, they are at the same time leaner and more flexible from an organizational point of 
view. As a result hereof, they are able to react more rapidly to changing market conditions 
than the big four.  
Bank Total assets Market Number of Foreign strategic Total
 in RMB bn
1) share in % 
2) Branches investor stake
Bank of Communications (BoCom) 
3) 1,423.4 3.8% 2,607 HSBC 19.90%
China Merchants Bank 734.6 2.0% 456 - -
China CITIC Bank 594.6 1.6% 416 BBVA 4.83%
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 573.5 1.5% 350 Citigroup 4.60%
China Minsheng Bank 557.4 1.5% 240 Temasek Holdings, IFC 5.60%
China Everbright Bank 530.1 1.4% 382 Asian Development Bank 1.90%
Industrial Bank 474.8 1.3% 328
Hang Seng Bank, 
GIC Singapore, IFC
24.90%




Guangdong Development Bank 355.8 0.9% 500 Citigroup, IBM 24.74%
Shenzhen Development Bank 222.4 0.6% 238 Newbridge Capital 17.89%
Evergrowing Bank 37.0 0.1% 76 Standard Chartered 15.00%
China Zheshang Bank 21.8 0.1% 6 - -
China Bohai Bank
3) n/a n/a 1 Standard Chartered 19.99%
Total 5,881.9 15.7% 5,866
Average (including BoCom) 490.2 1.3% 451
Average (excluding BoCom) 405.3 1.1% 272
1) To facilitate comparability, all figures are from 2005 as no 2006 figures were available for many banks
3) China Bohai Bank started operations on 16 Febraury 2006
  Table 2: Most joint-stock commercial banks are already invested in
2) Reclassified as a large state owned bank in 2007 by CBRC
 
Source: own illustration and calculations based on CBRC (2007), China CITIC Bank (Ed.) 
(2007), p. 56 / China Bohai Bank (2007)., Anderlini, Jamil / Thal Larsen, Peter / Böschen, Mark 
(2007). 
Even though every player has its own unique characteristics, joint-stock banks share a com-
mon set of competitive advantages over other domestic bank groups. Owing to their partially 
                                                 
30 Garcia-Herrero, Alicia/ Santabarbara, Daniel (2004), p. 14. 
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private ownership structure and the fact, that they were never heavily engaged in policy lend-
ing
32, they have a more market oriented and entrepreneurial corporate culture than the big four 
or the city commercial banks
33.  
Being already more commercially oriented than other bank groups in China, JSCB’s might be 
more adaptive to international best practices brought in by foreign investors. Since the joint-
stock banks have no significant history of policy lending, they were generally able to avoid 
piling up the for Chinese credit institutions characteristic high amounts of non-performing 
loans
34. This allows them and their foreign investors to focus on future growth rather than on 
cleaning up balance sheets. 
Foreign banks could also greatly benefit from the JSCB’s localized expertise and cooperate in 
creating new products which are custom tailored to the Chinese market. It therefore can be 
concluded that joint-stock banks are indeed very well suited for foreign investments, which is 
confirmed by the fact, that almost all of them are already invested in.  
The survey results ranked city commercial banks as the second most attractive group of in-
vestment targets. In 2006, there were 113 city commercial banks (CCB’s) in China. While 
every individual CCB’s market share is negligible on a nationwide basis, they are well estab-
lished in their home cities, where they generally rank amongst the top 3 to 5 players. Their 
distribution networks comprise 50 branches on average, but the largest ones operate over 200 
outlets
35. Even though regionally concentrated in their headquarters’ municipalities, they still 
outnumber the nationwide branch networks of leading foreign banks in China by far. Invest-
ing into a CCB would therefore allow a foreign bank to gain a degree of regionally focused 
market penetration, which would be completely unachievable through organic growth.  
The CCB’s key attraction and competitive advantage lies in their deep local roots in their mu-
nicipality. They possess preferred access to local knowledge and information and have estab-
                                                 
32 The Economist Intelligence Unit (Ed.) (2007), p. 22. 
33 CBC Shanghai (Ed.) (2006), p. 17 and Deutsche Bank Research (Ed.) (2004), p. 4. 
34 Abotsi, Kodjo (2007), p. 3. 
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lished extremely strong relationships to key decision makers at local governments
36. Being 
well connected in the local business and political scene, they have a clear advantage in the 
relationship driven commercial banking business with small and medium sized enterprises in 
their municipalities
37.  
The CBRC also announced in April 2007 that it would enable well performing city commer-
cial banks to expand beyond the borders of their headquarters’ municipalities
38. By way of 
exception, the Bank of Beijing and Bank of Shanghai were already allowed in 2006 to open 
branches in Tianjin and Ninbgo respectively
39. The newly created possibility of cross-regional 
expansion has definitely increased the attractiveness of CCB’s to foreign investors further.  
On the flipside, CCB’s face severe problems, investors should be aware of. These include 
their narrow, undifferentiated product offering paired with low innovative potential, ineffi-
cient internal management and risk controls and a lack of qualified staff
40. Additionally, many 
CCB’s are currently preoccupied with cleaning up their balance sheets and therefore lack the 
necessary resources to proactively launch growth initiatives. While the official total NPL ratio 
of city commercial banks was with 4.78% lower than that of SOCB’s (9.22%) in 2006
41, some 
individual banks are estimated to be burdened much heavier. In 2004, unofficial sources sus-
pected non-performing loans to account for over 50% of some CCB’s loan books
42.  
The high geographical concentration of CCB’s loan portfolios increases their balance sheets’ 
structural weakness further
43, as it makes them overly vulnerable to a local economic slow-
down in their respective cities. According to The Banker, only approximately 30 city com-
mercial banks had decent balance sheets in 2005 and would therefore be suitable investment 
targets
44. Summarizing the above, city commercial banks indeed possess some unique charac-
teristics making them well suited for foreign banks pursuing a regionally focused market de-
                                                 
36 Deutsche Bank Research (Ed.) (2006), p. 6. 
37 KPMG (Ed.) (2005), p. 5. 
38 CBRC (2007b). 
39 CBRC (2007), p. 42. 
40 People’s Daily Online (2005). 
41 CBRC (2007c). 
42 KPMG (Ed.) (2005), p. 10. 
43 Deutsche Bank Research (Ed.) (2006), p. 6. 
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velopment strategy in China. Due to structural issues faced by most CCB’s these investments 
seem however more risky than those in joint-stock banks. Table 3 (below) provides an over-
view of city commercial banks which have already attracted foreign investors in recent years. 
Year City commercial bank Foreign strategic investors
Total foreign 
equity share
1999 Bank of Shanghai HSBC, IFC, Shanghai Comm. Bank Hong Kong 18.00%
2001 Nanjing City Commercial Bank BNP Paribas, IFC 24,9%
2002 Xian City Commercial Bank IFC, Scotiabank Canada 5.00%
2003 Dalian City Commercial Bank SHK Hong Kong, Scotiabank Canada, IFC 15.00%
2004 Jinan City Commercial Bank CBA 11.00%
2005 Bank of Beijing ING Group, IFC 24.90%
2005 Hangzhou City Commercial Bank CBA, ADB 24.89%
2005 Nanchong City Commercial Bank DEG, SIDT 13.00%
2005 Tianjin City Commercial Bank ANZ Bank 19.90%
2006 Ningbo City Commercial Bank OCBC Singapore 12.20%
2007 Chongqing Commercial Bank Dah Sing Bank 17.00%
  Table 3: Many major city commercial banks already invested in
 
Source: own illustration and calculations based on KPMG (Ed) (2007), p. 17 / The Boston Consulting 
Group (Ed.) (2006), p.11 / Löchel, Horst (2006), p. 27f / ZEPHYR database analysis 
As shown in section 2.3.1.1. the majority of interview participants considers access to the 
target’s distribution network to be the most unique strategic benefit derived from an invest-
ment. The subsequent analysis in section 2.3.2.1 supported this finding. With a combined 
network of 71,993 branches all over China, the big four state-owned commercial banks should 
therefore have theoretically emerged as the undisputed first choice investment targets.  
A closer look at their market power seems to underpin this assumption. ICBC commands a 
massive market share of 17.2%, disposes of 18,764 branches
45, covers approximately 80% of 
the PRC’s small and medium sized enterprises and is estimated to be the country’s biggest 
mortgage lender
46. With 28,234 branches, the Agricultural Bank of China disposes of the larg-
est distribution network of all Chinese banks and hence a unique reach into the country’s re-
mote rural areas. It had a market share of 12.7% in 2005. The Bank of China claims dominant 
                                                 
45 China CITIC Bank (Ed.) (2007), p. 55. 
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positions in foreign exchange, international settlement and trade finance. It commands a mar-
ket share of 12.7% and disposes of 11,018 branches
47. China Construction bank claims market 
leadership  in  infrastructure  loans,  residential  mortgage  and  bank  cards
48.  Its  market  share 
amounts to 12.2% and its distribution network consists of 13,977 branches
49. Table 4 (below) 
illustrates the big four’s dominant market position and lists their major foreign strategic inves-
tors. 
Bank Total assets Market  Number of Major 
 in RMB m
1) share in % Branches foreign strategic investors 
2)
ICBC 6,456,131 17.2% 18,764 Goldman Sachs, Allianz Group, American Express
ACB 4,771,019 12.7% 28,234 not invested in
BOC 4,742,806 12.7% 11,018 RBS, Merrill Lynch, UBS
CCB 4,585,742 12.2% 13,977 Bank of America
Total 20,555,698 54.9% 71,993
1) To facilitate comparability, all figures are from 2005 as no 2006 figures were available for ACB. 
2) Includes only strategic investors engaging in meaningful strategic cooperation.
Table 4: Big four state-owned commercial banks - unparalleled distribution power
Source: own illustration and calculations based on China CITIC Bank (Ed.) (2007), p. 55 / Goldman 
Sachs (2006). / KPMG (Ed) (2007), p. 17 
These figures allow for two conclusions. They firstly confirm the general suitability of in-
vestments in the big four to gain access to a comprehensive distribution network and huge 
client base. But they secondly also indicate how difficult it is for a foreign investor to effect 
even minor changes in these gigantic institutions. It has also been shown in chapter 2.2.2.2., 
how concerned the Chinese government is with maintaining control over the country’s lead-
ing financial institutions. Against this background, there is no chance for a foreign investor to 
gain meaningful management control over one of the big four, which greatly reduces their 
attractiveness. Acquiring even small equity stakes in the big four is due to their vast size 
much more expensive than in second or third tier banks and therefore for many smaller and 
medium sized foreign banks per se no viable option. 
                                                 
47 China CITIC Bank (Ed.) (2007), p. 55.  
48 China Construction Bank (2007). 
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While the above analyzed the respective strengths and weaknesses of the, according to the 
survey results most popular target groups, it goes without saying that every investment deci-
sion is unique and proper target identification can therefore only be conducted on a case by 
case basis. Factors such as the foreign bank’s own value proposition, its market development 
strategy in China, the strategic fit between acquirer and target and the willingness of the tar-
get’s management to cooperate are all of paramount importance and vary greatly from trans-
action  to  transaction.  The  above  conducted  analysis  rather  demonstrated  that  every  bank 
group has its own characteristic strengths and weaknesses, which should be taken into consid-
eration. Apart from that, it excluded one crucial point: the availability of attractive targets.  
It has been shown throughout this section, that most of the joint-stock and state-owned com-
mercial banks as well as many of the bigger city commercial banks are already invested in. 
This leads to the question, whether they have for this reason become completely unapproach-
able for other foreign investors. A review of the available research literature suggests that the 
maximum combined equity proportion held by all foreign investors in one Chinese bank may 
not exceed 25%
50. The conclusion drawn from this is that attractive targets are becoming ex-
ceedingly rare in China.  
There seems to be however a loophole in the 25% cap on the combined foreign ownership in 
Chinese banks. Article 9 of the relevant “Administrative Rules Governing the Equity Invest-
ment in Chinese Financial Institutions by Overseas Financial Institutions” (Rules) enacted in 
December 2003 reads as follows:  
Where the combined equity investment proportion of all overseas financial institutions in a 
non-listed Chinese financial institution is equal to or exceeds 25 percent, the non-listed Chi-
nese financial institution shall be treated as a foreign-funded financial institution by the regu-
latory authority. 
Where the combined equity investment proportion of all overseas financial institutions in a 
listed Chinese financial institution is equal to or exceeds 25 percent, the listed Chinese finan-
                                                 
50 The Boston Consulting Group (Ed.) (2006), p.15 /  
     The Economist Intelligence Unit (Ed.) (2007), p. 25 / CBC Shanghai (Ed.) (2006), p.24 /  
     Anderlini, Jamil / Thal Larsen, Peter / Böschen, Mark (2007)., Löchel, Horst (2006), p. 37 / 
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cial institution shall still be treated as a Chinese financial institution by the regulatory au-
thority
51. 
This case discrimination explicitly regulates the eventuality of combined foreign ownership 
exceeding 25% of a target’s equity. The only undesirable consequence of that, a reclassifica-
tion of a non-listed Chinese bank into a foreign-funded financial institution can easily be cir-
cumvented by local incorporation. According to the in December 2006 enacted “Regulations 
of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  on  Administration  of  Foreign-funded  Banks”  (Regula-
tions), locally incorporated foreign-funded financial institutions enjoy the same regulatory 
treatment as Chinese financial institutions. This would suggest that the publicly perceived 
25% cap on combined foreign ownership of Chinese banks would be legally non-existent. It 
was unfortunately not possible to achieve final clarification of this issue within the scope of 
this paper and its accompanying research. The fact, that the 25% threshold has not been con-
tested yet, suggests however that this loophole is more theoretical in nature. Transactions try-
ing to outmaneuver the legal framework would most probably fail to obtain regulatory ap-
proval from the CBRC who retains the right of interpretation of the Rules (Article 20 of the 
Rules). 
2.4   Realizing value in an investment – challenges to deal with   
The so far discussed questions examined whether it would generally make sense to acquire 
minority stakes in Chinese banks, which unique strategic benefits this would yield and which 
targets would be best suited to invest in. In order to make a well informed final decision on 
whether equity investments in Chinese banks should constitute an integral part of a foreign 
financial institutions’ China strategy, it is important to gain an awareness of the problems and 
pitfalls these investments hold. The empirical survey  conducted therefore  addressed these 
issues. 
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2.4.1  Presentation of survey results 
Figure 6 (below) provides an overview of the answers obtained. The total number of times 
any given category was mentioned is not related to the number of respondents, as multiple 
nominations were permissible.    
Pitfalls Number of times mentioned
Where do you see the most severe pitfalls of investing in Chinese banks?








0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Deferred capital expenditures
Lack of strategic focus
Regulatory uncertainties
Lack of transparency
Culture (language, work style)
Credit risk management (NPL)
Management control/ governance
Source: own illustration and calculations   
The majority of all respondents clearly perceive the lack of control over the investment target 
in conjunction with the frequently low corporate governance standards at Chinese banks as 
the most pressing issue. They stated that since foreign investors were confined to playing the 
role of minority shareholders, it would be extremely hard for them to assume meaningful 
management control. At the same time they argued, that a certain degree of management con-
trol would be crucial to the integration of a strategic investment into a foreign bank’s overall 
China strategy. A great number of respondents directly linked the issue of gaining manage-
ment control to the often poor quality of corporate governance at Chinese banks. Two strategy 
consultants and one foreign bank executive raised the point, that even if a foreign investor 
would be able to formally secure management control, this would not automatically guarantee 
its enforceability. The explanation given for this was that the official power structure would 
not necessarily equal the true chain of command at Chinese banks. Due to the decentralized 
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relatively autonomously from headquarter decisions and would be subject to massive influ-
ence from local governments in their region. 
The  underdeveloped  credit  risk  management  and  resulting  high  levels  of  non-performing 
loans at many Chinese banks emerged as the second most severe pitfall foreign investors 
would have to deal with. Many respondents stated that especially listed banks already made 
great progress in these regards in recent years but that it would nonetheless be of paramount 
importance for foreign investors to conduct extensive due diligence on the loan book quality 
and risk management function in order to avoid unpleasant surprises later on. 
Cultural disparities between foreign and Chinese banks were the third most frequently men-
tioned pitfall. This included the generally existing language barrier between the Chinese and 
foreign side. Some interviewees also pointed to culturally founded differences in management 
and work style, which would make it difficult for foreign investors to implement changes at 
the investment target and to realize their strategic goals. Another frequently quoted problem 
to deal with is the lack of transparency encountered at many Chinese banks. This would make 
the assessment of the risks taken in an investment a very delicate issue. 
Apart from these major concerns, some respondents also mentioned regulatory uncertainties, a 
lack of strategic focus on the investor’s side and deferred capital expenditures (e.g. costly 
replacement of malfunctioning IT-infrastructure) as pitfalls to be aware of. Especially the 
strategy consultants interviewed were very specific about the point, that foreign financial in-
stitutions investing in Chinese banks must be absolutely clear about the goals they want to 
achieve this way in order to truly generate value.  
2.4.2  Discussion of key findings 
Difficulties in gaining and enforcing management control were the most frequently quoted 
challenges foreign banks must deal with in their strategic investments in China. This result is 
perfectly in line with two surveys published by PricewaterhouseCoopers in September 2005 
and May 2007, in which senior executives from foreign banks (35 and 40 respectively) re-
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teaming up with a Chinese partner
52. While it is true, that the degree of management control, 
foreign banks can expect to achieve through acquiring a minority stake of less than or equal to 
20% is in most cases extremely limited, there are examples of foreign investors effectively 
controlling Chinese banks. These are the already described cases of Shenzhen Development 
Bank (Newbridge Capital, minority stake: 17.9%) and Guangdong Development Bank (Citi-
group, minority stake: 20.0%). Newbridge Capital achieved management control by securing 
the right to appoint the chairman and other senior executives at the target
53. Citigroup in-
stalled one of its longtime bankers as president of Guangdong Development Bank and holds 6 
out of 17 board seats
54. Admittedly, these cases are rare exceptions, but they could serve as 
role models for similar arrangements at smaller joint-stock or city commercial banks in the 
future.  
However, there are a few factors indicating, that official management control does not always 
guarantee the ability to truly exercise it. The first reason for this is the Chinese state’s persis-
tent influence over domestic banks. The big four state-owned commercial banks are under the 
1995  enacted  Commercial  Banking  Law  still  required  to  adhere  to  orders  from  the  State 
Council  regarding  lending  decisions
55.  The  State  Council  also  determines  the  repayment 
method of loans extended to special projects
56. Further to that, the ruling communist party 
commands a well-functioning network allowing it to circumvent the board of directors and 
shareholders’  meeting  in  effecting  decisions  at  domestic  banks
57.  In  2005,  Guo  Shuping, 
chairman of China Construction Bank together with Xie Ping, head of Central Huijin Invest-
ment
58 publicly complained about CCB’s party committee excessive influence over the bank’s 
operations and management which would be “contrary to CCB’s corporate bylaws”
59.  
                                                 
52 PricewaterhouseCoopers (Ed.) (2005), p. 36 / PricewaterhouseCoopers (Ed.) (2007), p. 46. 
53 International Herald Tribune (Ed.) (2006).  
54 The bank officially denies to have full management control, but states that it  “…does exert influence  
     through its board representation.”. Source: Carew, Rick (2007).  
55 The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (1995), article 41. 
56 Lee, Dongwook (2005), p. 38.  
57 Taylor, Peter (2006), p. 107. 
58 Central Huijin Investment is the government controlled investment vehicle through which the Chinese state 
holds its shares in the big four state-owned commercial banks. 
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In this regard, it is also worth noting that senior executives at banks are generally appointed 
by the state or communist party in China, which was also criticized by Xie Ping. This practice 
also applies to banks with partial private ownership (including the officially private China 
Minsheng Bank) and those listed at stock exchanges
60. The consequence of this is that it is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible for foreign investors to replace uncooperative or incom-
petent (middle) management without consent from the respective decision makers at various 
government or party levels.  
Beyond that, most banks’ decentralized structures make their vast branch networks difficult to 
control and leave remote branches vulnerable to politically influenced lending
61. Many Chi-
nese banks still operate outdated and non-uniform IT-platforms. Key processes are therefore 
frequently paper based, which makes them hard to trace and control from head offices
62. Even 
joint-stock banks, which generally possess higher corporate governance standards than other 
groups of Chinese banks, experienced difficulties in controlling their branches in the recent 
past. A characteristic example is the case of Huaxia, in which Deutsche Bank is invested in. 
The bank discovered in 2003 that its Guangzhou branch bypassed internal risk controls by 
breaking up bigger loans into several smaller ones
63. Against this background, upgrading the 
existing IT-infrastructure and implementing sound control mechanisms appears to be an im-
portant task for foreign investors in order to fully benefit from the access they gained to the 
target’s distribution network. A certain degree of management control together with the Chi-
nese partner’s active support is in any case a necessary prerequisite for this. 
Dealing with the for Chinese banks almost notorious issue of weak credit risk management 
and high levels of non-performing loans is according to the survey results the second most 
decisive challenge for foreign investors. Many Chinese banks are well aware of their prob-
lems and have already made noteworthy progresses in reducing their non-performing loan 
ratios. This can however to a large extent be attributed to the rapid expansion of their loan 
books and in the case of the big four to the government initiated removals of NPL’s from the 
                                                 
60 Taylor, Peter (2006), p. 96 / Lee, Dongwook (2005), p. 35. 
61 He, Liping/ Fan, Xiaohang (2004), p. 12. 
62 CBC Shanghai (Ed.) (2006), p. 20.  
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banks’ balance sheets
64. According to some reports, lending and risk management practices 
have not been improved significantly in recent years
65. A working paper published by the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) in March 2006, for instance analyzed the lending behavior 
of the big four state-owned commercial banks during the time from 1997 to 2003. It found, 
that they essentially did not take their borrowers’ credit worthiness into account and that lend-
ing was primarily driven by the availability of funds
66. In another working paper published in 
December 2006, the IMF concluded that the structures of foreign investors’ strategic agree-
ments might not provide them with sufficient opportunities to improve the risk management 
of their Chinese partners
67. This research indicates that the problem of non-performing loans 
might not be solved in the short-term and that gaining control of and enhancing the target’s 
risk management function is critical to securing its long-term value.  
Culturally founded differences in management and work style between the Chinese and for-
eign side can make this task extremely difficult. The case of Bank of China’s first foreign 
chief credit risk supervisor Lonnie Dounn, who resigned in 2006 after only 16 months as a 
result of personal difficulties in dealing with cultural and communication related issues exem-
plifies this
68. To deal with the potential cultural clash, foreign banks are confronted with the 
difficult task of recruiting staff with an excellent international skill set and track record on the 
one hand and a deep understanding and appreciation of the Chinese business mentality on the 
other hand to mediate between their headquarters and the investment target’s management. 
 
3  Final conclusions   
It was demonstrated throughout this paper, that there are indeed several unique strategic bene-
fits to be derived from investments in Chinese banks. Most importantly, these transactions 
represent the fastest, most economic and effective way of gaining access to a meaningful dis-
                                                 
64 McKinsey Global Institute (Ed.) (2006), p. 14. 
65 McKinsey Global Institute (Ed.) (2006), p. 14 / DZ BANK AG (Ed.) (2004), p. 24f. 
66 Podpiera, Richard (2006), p.18. 
67 Leigh, Lamin / Podpiera, Richard (2006), p. 7. 
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tribution network. They furthermore enable foreign banks to tap their Chinese counterparts’ 
frequently huge client bases. This in turn allows foreign banks to leverage the local knowl-
edge and market position of their Chinese partners in order to educate themselves further 
about  the  peculiarities  of  the  Chinese  market  and  customer  requirements.  These  strategic 
benefits are unique to investments in Chinese banks and could not be realized through organic 
growth. It is very straightforward, that large scale access to a Chinese player’s client base and 
local knowledge requires the close cooperation established through an equity investment. Due 
to regulatory restrictions, foreign banks are furthermore unable to match Chinese banks’ vast 
distribution networks by building up the necessary infrastructure from scratch. 
It could be shown in this paper, that joint-stock commercial banks are adequate investment 
targets for foreign banks pursuing a nationwide strategy, while city commercial banks would 
allow for a highly focused regional market exploration. The final target selection is however 
strongly influenced by the involved players’ individual strategic profiles as well as the avail-
ability of attractive targets. The most critical point in selecting a target is according to the re-
search results the ability to exercise a certain degree of management control and to avoid 
banks burdened with excessive non-performing loan ratios. While there are still several prom-
ising City Commercial Banks available to foreign investors, the practically applied cap on 
foreign ownership of Chinese financial institutions makes it hard to find adequate targets.  
The question, whether equity investments in Chinese banks would be indispensable for for-
eign banks to succeed in the Chinese banking market could not be finally answered. While it 
was pointed out, that most of the leading foreign banks in China are invested in domestic 
players, there is one prominent exception to this. Being highly successful, the Bank of East 
Asia so far solely relies on organic growth in China. Notwithstanding this, investments in 
Chinese banks nowadays constitute an integral part of most leading players’ market explora-
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Appendix 1: Research questionnaire 
1.   As of today, foreign banks may only acquire 20% of a Chinese bank’s equity. Do you 
expect this regulation to change over the next 1-2 years? 
2.   Would you advise a foreign bank to acquire a minority stake in a local bank as a strategic 
means of exploring the Chinese market? 
3.  Which major strategic benefits, that could not be gained through organic growth initiatives 
would that [i.e. an investment in a Chinese bank] yield? 
4.   Given the structure of the Chinese banking sector, which group of banks or which indi-
vidual player would you consider best suited for foreign investments and why? 
5.   Where do you see the most severe pitfalls of investing in Chinese banks? 
6.   Given the sector’s current and expected future development, would you describe invest-
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# Firm Location Date *)
1 Commerzbank AG Hong Kong 18.05.07 p
2 Commerzbank AG Hong Kong 25.05.07 p
3 Commerzbank AG Shanghai 29.05.07 p
4 Commerzbank AG Hong Kong 25.05.07 p
5 Deloitte & Touche Corporate Finance Ltd. Hong Kong 18.05.07 t
6 Dresdner Bank AG Shanghai 04.06.07 p
7 DZ BANK AG Shanghai 31.05.07 p
8 Goldman Sachs Hong Kong 04.07.07 t
9 LBBW Shanghai 29.05.07 p
10 Nord LB Shanghai 06.06.07 m
11 Oliver Wyman Shanghai 30.05.07 t
12 Quam Capital Limited Hong Kong 17.05.07 p
13 Quam Capital Limited Hong Kong 23.05.07 p
14 Roland Berger Strategy Consultants Shanghai 31.05.07 p
15 Savings Banks Foundation for International Cooperation Shanghai 01.06.07 m
16 Standard Chartered Shanghai 05.06.07 p
17 The Bank of East Asia Hong Kong 16.05.07 p
18 The Boston Consulting Group Beijing 30.05.07 t
19 UBS AG Hong Kong 12.06.07 p
20 WestLB AG Shanghai 05.06.07 t
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